Executive Powers of the Intelligence Services, or: Who Watches the Watchmen?

DOI: https://doi.org/10.71372/MELR8788

Keywords: Executive powers of intelligence services, Hybrid warfare, Asymetric warfare, Secret service oversight

Abstract: The text examines whether the Security Information Service (BIS) should gain executive authority to have lawfully obtained intelligence admitted in criminal proceedings. The issue is analysed against the intensifying hybrid operations by Russian secret services in the Czech Republic and the erosion of transatlantic certainties that have underpinned the strategic culture reliant on alliance cooperation and security guarantees. The author considers the sustainability of the currently applied doctrine that strictly separates intelligence and police bodies, under which Czech services lack executive powers. That undermines the state’s ability to fight counterespionage, terrorism, and organised crime. The author therefore analyses a possible legislative reinforcement of BIS by allowing lawful intelligence to be used for criminal justice proceedings, while preserving robust parliamentary, executive, and judicial oversight. The key challenge is balancing Czech security self-reliance with safeguards of the democratic rule of law.

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