Conflicts of legal principles within the DCFR

DOI: https://doi.org/10.71372/DVTE7491

Keywords: DCFR, principles, contract, freedom, principles

Abstract: Legal principles can be described as abstract legal rules that do not directly determine what behaviour is expected or what behaviour is permitted, but they contribute to the resolution of legal relations, especially those whose assessment is based on evaluation or discretion. As metanormative starting points, they represent basic regulative ideas, expressing the value (or moral) content that is linked to the basic idea of law. The conditions set by legal principles under which legal consequences are to occur are set more generally, or much less precisely, than in the case of a legal norm. According to Ronald Dworkin, the difference between legal principles and legal norms is logical: the logical argument of exclusion of the third does not apply to them (the norm is either valid or not valid, there is nothing in between), but their validity has different intensity. The goal or value of the legal principles that they represent should be achieved to the greatest extent possible, and in the event of a collision between two principles, one principle becomes decisive (the one with the higher value), but the other principle does not lose its validity. The following article addresses the question of how conflicts between legal principles were resolved within the framework of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).

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